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hese days, our thoroughly digitalized societies run on data. Indeed, the 
notion of data is embedded in the very concept of digitalization, and no pro-
cess or service that relies on computing power is conceivable without it. It is 
therefore only natural that experts of international humanitarian law (IHL) 
have for a while now pondered over the question of how to treat data under 
the existing legal frameworks applicable to armed conflicts, starting from the 
premise that military operations affecting data “could cause more harm to 
civilians than the destruction of physical objects.”1 At the same time, the 
debate has at times suffered from ambiguities and inaccuracies concerning 
the subject matter. This article attempts to clarify some of the concepts in-
volved and lays out the problem by exposing the relevance of the protection 
of data in armed conflict, based on a number of brief scenarios. After sum-
marizing the present debate relating to the application of the rules of armed 
conflict, the article goes beyond the limited scope of existing IHL in order 
to advance awareness of the problem as a starting point for further discus-
sion. 
 
II. MAPPING THE THREAT LANDSCAPE: DATA RISKS IN                    
CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICT 
 
Military cyber operations can affect civilian data in different ways, depending 
on the means of conduct and the operation’s target. The following scenarios 
shall make clear what is potentially at stake. 
 
A. Scenario A – Ransomware operation against a hospital 
 
During an armed conflict between State A and State B, the military of State 
A carries out a ransomware operation against the servers of a hospital in 
State B that store patients’ case files, encrypting them until State B is willing 
to withdraw its troops from a contested island located on the continental 
shelf of State A. No patient suffers physical harm, but a great number of 
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surgeries and other essential medical treatments have to be postponed, and 
a couple of patients need to be transferred to other hospitals. 
In a variation of this scenario, the operation is only seemingly a ransom-
ware attack. In fact, the military of State A employs a wiper malware, which 
immediately leads to the destruction of all patient files on the affected server, 
requiring hospital staff to recreate the files on paper from scratch. 
 
B. Scenario B – Financial damage through data leaks 
 
A few days before the company’s initial public offering at the national stock 
exchange, the military of State B launches a cyber operation against the in-
formation technology (IT) systems of Company C, which is headquartered 
in State A. The two States have been engaged in an armed conflict for the 
past year. State B’s military cyber unit extracts a large file containing sensitive 
business data that expose a financial scandal involving the leadership of 
Company C, the chief executive officer of the national stock exchange, and 
the heads of the national financial supervision authority. State B subse-
quently leaks the data through a non-governmental organization that special-
izes in exposing classified information and other secrets. As a result, the ini-
tial public offering of Company C is cancelled and the stock market crashes, 
which leads to considerable economic damage and a sustained rise in unem-
ployment in State A. 
 
C. Scenario C – Cyber operation against water treatment facility 
 
During an armed conflict, the military of State A engages in an offensive 
cyber operation against the industrial control systems of a water treatment 
facility in State B, altering critical data sets essential for the maintenance of 
the correct level and mixture of chemicals for processing the drinking water 
for a city. As employees notice the tampering, they carry out an emergency 
shutdown of the facility, which leads to minor water shortages in the city for 
three days. 
 
D. Scenario D – Data collection and release 3.0 
 
State A, a religious and socially conservative country, is in an armed conflict 
with State B. Company C is the major state-owned petroleum and natural 
gas company in State A. State B’s military cyber unit deploys the “Mimikatz 











stolen password of one of the executives, the military hackers manage to 
extract unencrypted emails and employees’ social security numbers. One 
email reveals that two employees are homosexuals, which is a felony punish-
able by imprisonment in State A. Pretending to be citizens of State A that 
belong to an organisation concerned with “religious purity,” members of the 
cyber unit leak the sensitive information to major newspapers in State A, 
which subsequently publish stories about the two employees. This leads to 
criminal indictments and death threats. State B’s military also sells the social 
security numbers on the dark web. 
 
E. Scenario E – Digital blackmail 
 
After a year of armed hostilities between States A and B, the military of State 
B hacks the IT systems of the largest cell phone and internet provider of 
State A. The hackers extract a large trove of data, among them the location 
data and call records of all customers. They also use the company’s networks 
to secretly install surveillance software in one of the country’s main internet 
exchange points, allowing State B to subsequently monitor the data traffic in 
State A in real time. The analysis of the phone and internet metadata reveals, 
inter alia, that member of parliament M, who belongs to the ruling party in 
State A, has been having an extramarital affair. The military of State B uses 
that information to coerce M into voting against a parliamentary act that 
would have significantly increased troop presence on the border between the 
two countries. 
 
III. THE QUALIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF DATA UNDER             
EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
A. Conceptual Explications 
 
Before commencing with the application of black-letter law to cyber opera-
tions against “data” in armed conflict, a couple of notional clarifications are 
in order. The first and most important is the concept of “data” itself. In its 
most general sense, computer data is 
 
information processed or stored by a computer. This information may be 
in the form of text documents, images, audio clips, software programs, or 
other types of data. Computer data may be processed by the computer’s 
CPU and is stored in files and folders on the computer’s hard disk. At its 











as binary data. Because all computer data is in binary format, it can be cre-
ated, processed, saved, and stored digitally. This allows data to be trans-
ferred from one computer to another using a network connection or vari-
ous media devices. It also does not deteriorate over time or lose quality 
after being used multiple times.2 
 
In other words, the entirety of the “raw material” needed by computer 
systems to function can be described as data. This is crucial and at times 
poorly understood by legal scholars and policy-makers who try to grapple 
with the legal implications of “attacking data,” as the unspoken focus is often 
on data that represents information that can be read, viewed, heard, or oth-
erwise sensually consumed by humans, but not on data that carries infor-
mation solely to be processed by computing units. This distinction at the 
factual level is important, as it needs to be clarified what is meant when we 
talk about “data protection” in armed conflict.  
One of the few scholars to make this clear and to take it as the starting 
point of her inquiry is Heather Harrisson Dinniss, who proposes two sepa-
rate categories of data relevant for the legal analysis: First, content-level data, 
“such as the text of this article, or the contents of medical databases, library 
catalogues and the like.”3 This is data that represents information which, af-
ter being processed, is in principle intelligible to humans, for example when 
displayed on a computer screen. Second, operational-level data, “also known 
as logical-level data or, more commonly, program data . . . gives hardware its 
functionality and ability to perform the tasks we require. Operating systems, 
software applications, and supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems are all examples of operational-level data.”4 This category 
of data, which consists of machine-readable commands, is more commonly 
referred to as “code,” as noted by Dinniss. Crucially for the following legal 
analysis, her examination is almost entirely focused on the second category, 
as she considers content-level data, with few exceptions, outside the scope 
of the law of armed conflict. Most other scholars tackle the question of 
whether and in which way IHL protects content-level data when explicitly 
talking about “data protection” in armed conflict.  
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A further distinction between different kinds of computer data that is 
not to be confused with the categories proposed by Dinniss is that between 
content data and metadata. The latter is data about data, i.e., data that sum-
marizes basic information about data, such as author, date created, or file 
size.5 For example, while the text of an email is its content, the timestamp, 
information about its size in kilobytes, and perhaps the geolocation of its 
sender (especially if dispatched via a mobile device) is the email’s metadata. 
Importantly, metadata is not “code”; the information expressed is intelligible 
to humans. In Dinniss’ understanding, both the email’s content and its 
metadata thus count as “content-level data.” 
These factual-definitional distinctions between data are complemented 
by a normative dimension: the differentiation between personal and non-
personal data. The distinction lies at the foundation of modern data protec-
tion frameworks such as the European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). Personal data is “any information that relates to an identified or 
identifiable living individual. Different pieces of information, which col-
lected together can lead to the identification of a particular person, also con-
stitute personal data.”6 While “operational-level data,” as understood by 
Dinniss, will, almost by default, not fall within the scope of personal data, 
“content-level data,” both content information itself and metadata fre-
quently will, although not always. The content of an email that conveys the 
information that the sender is getting married next week is personal data, 
whereas content that merely makes a statement about the weather (usually) 
is not. 
Strictly speaking, the protection of data in armed conflict is concerned 
not with “data protection” in the common legal sense, which is the body of 
law that regulates how personal data may be processed by persons and enti-
ties who control that data,7 but with “data security,” which is part of the rules 
on data protection8 but conceptually belongs to information/IT security. 
The key concepts of data/information security, which are highly relevant for 
the matter at hand, but not always sufficiently spelled out in this context, are 
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the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the IT systems that process 
the data and the data itself. “Confidentiality” means that data, and the system 
on which it is stored, are protected from unauthorised access in order to 
prevent misuse of the data. It is closely related to and a precondition of pri-
vacy. Online surveillance measures, or the extraction of data by way of elec-
tronic espionage operations, affect the confidentiality of data. “Integrity” of 
data refers to the maintaining and assuring of the accuracy and completeness 
of stored data. Adversarial cyber operations that delete targeted data, for ex-
ample by means of a wiper malware, or that manipulate data to alter the 
outcome of a certain computing process, as in the case of Stuxnet, concern 
the integrity of data. Finally, “availability” of data means that the stored in-
formation is accessible and processable whenever needed or desired. A dis-
tributed denial of service attack that leads to a crash of the targeted IT system 
affects the availability of the data located on that system for as long as the 
operation lasts. Ransomware that encrypts all data stored on a system’s hard 
drive is also an operation against the availability of that data. When assessing 
military cyber operations in the context of armed conflicts, referring to the 
three basic concepts of information security adds analytical clarity, as differ-
ent rules may apply and different legal consequences may follow, depending 
on which protective goal is concerned. 
 
B. International Humanitarian Law 
 
Depending on what category of data is being examined, the analysis of legal 
protections under IHL will differ. Taking Dinniss’ fundamental distinction 
as a starting point, the emphasis of the following survey of existing law will 
be on content-level data, for reasons that will be explained. 
 
1. Targeting operational-level data (code)–the “standard type” of cyber 
operation 
 
Cyber operations that successfully target either the availability or the integrity 
of operational-level data “will result in loss of functionality of the system.”9 
However, the “object of attack” of such an operation is not the data as such 
but the affected system itself, as correctly pointed out by Michael N. 
Schmitt.10 Indeed, in the physical world we do not think of the objective of 
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an attack as the atoms and molecules forming an object, but of an attack 
against their sum-total, i.e., the object as such. If all software code is con-
ceived of as “data,” as Dinniss correctly put forward, then virtually every 
type of cyber operation by definition targets data. The limited exceptions 
include variations of so-called side-channel attacks. These cyber operations 
include altering, adding, rewriting, corrupting or otherwise manipulating 
lines of code (data) by means of introducing code (data) in the form of vi-
ruses, worms, trojan horses, rootkits, etc. Therefore, in order to assess what 
rules of existing IHL might apply and whether the operation would be pro-
hibited due to a violation of the principle of distinction (Article 48(1) Addi-
tional Protocol I (AP I)),11 the principle of proportionality (Article 51(5)(b) 
AP I), or of the duty of precautions in attack (Article 57 AP I), one needs to 
look at the consequences of the operation. In other words, this is the stand-
ard debate concerning the qualification of military cyber operations under 
the laws of armed conflict, as dealt with exhaustively in both academic liter-
ature and official legal statements by States. 
 
2. Conduct targeting content-level data–a legal grey zone under IHL 
 
This leaves the issue of the application of the rules of IHL to cyber opera-
tions that target content-level data. As observed by Dinniss, an operation 
that affects the integrity of stored data itself “will leave the system intact, 
albeit with corrupted or missing data.”12 Operations against the availability 
of data will have no effect on the data itself but will thwart its availability, 
although it can be argued that encrypting the data in a ransomware attack, 
even if the key to decrypt it exists, is actually directed against its integrity and 
not simply its availability. Military cyber operations that target the confiden-
tiality of data will, unless something unforeseen happens, harm neither the 
system itself nor the stored data, but merely make a copy of the latter. To 
date, the debate among experts and State representatives as to the applica-
bility of IHL to cyber operations against data directly has focused on conduct 
that compromises the integrity of data, as “[d]eleting or tampering with [es-
sential civilian data] could quickly bring government services and private 
                                                                                                                      
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 











businesses to a complete standstill, and could cause more harm to civilians 
than the destruction of physical objects.”13 
 
i. Special legal protections for certain categories of data 
 
Certain civilian infrastructure enjoys specific protection under IHL, includ-
ing, most importantly, medical services and infrastructure, which “must be 
respected and protected by the parties to the conflict at all times.”14 Due to 
this broad and unqualified scope, there is general agreement that this protec-
tion comprises personal medical data;15 for example, patient records or other 
information relating to individuals in treatment, as well as any other data 
“belonging to medical units and their personnel.”16 This position has been 
expressed by States that have made statements on the application of inter-
national law to cyber operations, most recently and explicitly, France.17 Fur-
thermore, as cyber operations that target objects indispensable for the sur-
vival of the civilian population are prohibited, data necessary for the func-
tioning of these especially protected objects and services is protected as well, 
as also observed by France.18 Thus, the targeting of medical data stored on 
hospital servers, as in scenario A, is prohibited irrespective of the conse-
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ii. Other content-level data 
 
The protection under IHL of data not necessary for medical or other indis-
pensable civilian services against adversarial cyber operations has been a con-
tentious and mostly unsettled issue. The principle of distinction stipulates 
that the parties to an armed conflict must at all times distinguish between 
civilian objects and military objectives. According to Article 52(2) AP I, 
“[a]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.” That provision de-
fines “military objectives” as “those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 
Consequently, there is general agreement among experts that targets of 
adversarial military cyber operations in armed conflict that are not “objects” 
are not protected by the principle of distinction and other rules of IHL that 
regulate targeting.19 Therefore, it needs to be clarified whether data by itself 
can be considered an object for the purpose of IHL. If not, cyber operations 
that do not affect the targeted IT systems and do not lead to physical conse-
quences but only have effects on the integrity of data itself, as in the above 
scenarios B, D, and E, would not fall under the ambit of the principle of 
distinction and other rules on targeting and would thus not or only minimally 
be protected in situations of armed conflict. 
The ongoing debate about the question of whether data has object-qual-
ity for the purpose of IHL comes down to two main positions. Proponents 
of the first view contend that the notion of “object” in Article 52(2) AP I, 
taking its ordinary meaning, implies that the target of the military operation 
must be an entity of a physical quality. In other words, it must be something 
that is visible and tangible in the real world.20 This argument is supposedly 
supported by the 1987 ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols and 
mainly rests on a very literal understanding of “object.” Data, as something 
invisible and intangible by definition, can therefore not be conceived as an 
object for the purpose of IHL. Only if the cyber operation targeting stored 
data subsequently and directly leads to physical effects on a physical object, 
as in scenario C above, will the principle of distinction and other relevant 
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rules of the laws of armed conflict apply.21 Furthermore, it has been put for-
ward that treating data as objects would considerably curtail the options bel-
ligerent States would have in armed conflict to act against their adversary. 
Given that the deletion or manipulation of data might provide a conven-
ient—and potentially less lethal or destructive—route to subdue the en-
emy,22 States would likely not accept an expansive interpretation of the no-
tion of “object” that would include data per se.23 
The opposing position holds that data can indeed be subsumed under 
the notion of “object.” The 1987 ICRC Commentary, which seems to suggest 
visibility and tangibility as necessary preconditions of object-quality, did not 
at all address the question of data—having been drafted and published be-
fore the digital transformation—but merely sought to clarify that only con-
crete things are subject to the principle of distinction and other rules, but 
not purely abstract concepts such as, for example, “civilian morale.” Consid-
ering this binary distinction, data was clearly notionally more akin to concrete 
things, given that it can be targeted and destroyed in a similar way as a mili-
tary would attack a building or an enemy’s weapon system. Morale, on the 
other hand, is a purely subjective category that might be affected by an attack 
but can hardly be targeted as such.24 Apart from this textual and contextual 
reading of Article 52 AP I, proponents of this view additionally invoke a 
teleological consideration. As Additional Protocol I generally aims at im-
proving the protection of victims of armed conflict, and Part IV of AP I, of 
which the rules under scrutiny form a part, deals with civilians as a subcate-
gory of victims of armed conflict in particular, it follows that “the object and 
purpose of Article 52(2) and its normative context is the enhancement of the 
protection of civilians during situations of armed conflict.”25 In light of this, 
a restrictive literal interpretation of “data” would have the consequence that 
“many targets whose physical equivalents are firmly protected by IHL from 
enemy combat action would be considered fair game as long as the effects 
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of the attack remain confined to cyberspace,”26 leading to a critical protec-
tion gap.27 This runs counter to the very rationale of this body of law and 
must thus be rejected on this basis.28 For these reasons, data should be ac-
cepted as an “object” in the context of military operations. Thus, the perti-
nent rules apply, which means that in the case that the data is to be qualified 
as a civilian object, it enjoys the protections of IHL. Emphasising the prem-
ise that societies have become too reliant on data to exclude it from the spe-
cific protections of IHL, France has recently explicitly endorsed this posi-
tion.29 
At the same time, if data is considered an object, it would additionally 
need to be assessed whether the military cyber operation could be considered 
an “attack” for the principal rules on targeting to be triggered, such as the 
rule of proportionality or the rule on precautions in attack. In this context, 
it has been pointed out that as soon as the object-quality of data is accepted, 
operations that aim at affecting the integrity of data would necessarily qualify 
as attacks given that “damage and destruction are conditions precedent to 
qualification as an attack.”30 This argument also implies that military conduct 
that leaves the data itself intact, such as espionage or surveillance operations 
that are merely directed against the confidentiality of data, would not count 
as an attack for the purpose of IHL.31 In light of this, it is unclear how to 
qualify operations that target the availability of data, such as a distributed 
denial of service attack. Schmitt suggests that “simply blocking data trans-
mission” would not suffice.32 However, this assessment only holds true in 
regard to data that does not belong to a specially protected category, as the 
medical data that was targeted in the above scenario A.  
 
C. International Human Rights Law and Data Protection Frameworks 
 
Many essential civilian data sets that could potentially be affected by adver-
sarial military cyber operations in situations of armed conflict that aim at 
                                                                                                                      
26. Id.  
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disrupting societal functions on the territory of their enemy fall into the cat-
egory of personal data as defined above. Examples that have been mentioned 
include “civil registries, insurance data, medical data,”33 and “social security 
data, tax records, and bank accounts.”34 Thus, prima facie, such data would 
be subject to the scope of data protection frameworks such as the GDPR. 
However, Article 2(2) GDPR clarifies that its provisions apply neither to 
“issues of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms or the free flow of 
personal data related to activities which fall outside the scope of Union law, 
such as activities concerning national security” nor to “the processing of per-
sonal data by member States when carrying out activities in relation to the 
common foreign and security policy of the Union.”35 This limitation would 
seem to preclude the application of this legislation from any State activities 
in relation to conduct during situations of armed conflict. To be sure, the 
fact that a State is party to an armed conflict does not relieve data control-
lers36 or data processors37 such as the banks, hospitals, or public administra-
tion officials that are in possession of and handle essential personal data of 
their customers and citizens, of their duties under data protection frame-
works such as the GDPR, where applicable. This includes the obligation to 
implement measures “to ensure a level of security [of the stored data] appro-
priate to the risk.”38 
Furthermore, contemporary data protection frameworks are, conceptu-
ally speaking, legislative substantiations of the human right to privacy. In 
light of this, it does seem worthwhile to ask whether this right might be ap-
plicable in situations of armed conflict, alongside the rules of IHL, to adver-
sarial cyber operations. This requires an examination of the relationship be-
tween IHL and international human rights law on the one hand,39 and of the 
application of human rights treaties to extraterritorial (“virtual”) situations 
                                                                                                                      
33. Laurent Gisel & Tilman Rodenhäuser, Cyber Operations and International Humanitar-
ian Law: Five Key Points, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Nov. 28, 2019), https://blogs. 
icrc.org/law-and-policy/2019/11/28/cyber-operations-ihl-five-key-points/. 
34. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 340. 
35. GDPR, supra note 7, pmbl., para. 16.  
36. See id. art. 4(7). 
37. See id. art. 4(8). 
38. See id. art. 32(1). 
39.  See, e.g., Janina Dill, Towards a Moral Division of Labour between IHL and IHRL during 
the Conduct of Hostilities, in LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICT 197 (Ziv Bohrer, Janina 











on the other.40 In the wake of the revelations regarding the extensive global 
online surveillance activity of U.S. and British intelligence services by Ed-
ward Snowden in 2013, Marko Milanovic advocated for a more expansive 
application of the right to privacy in order to reflect State conduct after the 
digital transformation.41 However, it should be noted that these deliberations 
concerned peacetime conduct and were limited to surveillance, which only 
tackles one aspect of operations targeting the confidentiality of data, not 
their integrity or availability. 
 
IV.  INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING APPLICABLE LAW:             
ADVANCING THE DEBATE 
 
As has been demonstrated in the foregoing sections, the debate revolving 
around the question of the protection of data in armed conflict at times suf-
fers from conceptual confusion and definitional ambiguities concerning the 
notion of “data” itself. This discussion has attempted to offer some clarifi-
cation. At its broadest and most basic understanding, almost every type of 
cyber operation is, by definition, targeting data. The inherent difficulties with 
trying to capture this foundational insight of cybersecurity within the existing 
rules of international law, including IHL, were eventually resolved by way of 
focusing on the consequences of cyber operations for the purpose of legal 
assessment (effects- or consequence-based approach).42 At the same time, 
this discussion is inherently limited as it does not address the question of 
what rules, if any, apply to cyber operations that are directed against data that 
merely represent information, the targeting of which does not have any phys-
ical effects at all.  
Therefore, the debate must go beyond what Dinniss calls “operational-
level data” and focus on “content-level data,” i.e., the protection of stored 
data in and of itself, which includes both what is commonly called “content” 
as well as metadata. Here, the ongoing debate among experts and policymak-
ers has revealed the inherent limitations of existing IHL, which at its core is 
concerned with the physical effects of armed conflict. As a consequence, 
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existing protections at most encompass cyber operations against the availa-
bility or the integrity of data, but only if they entail physical or otherwise 
tangible harmful consequences—as shown in scenarios B, D, and E. Oper-
ations against the confidentiality of data, for example in the context of sur-
veillance or espionage, but also for the purpose of misusing personal data in 
order to coerce or otherwise influence the behaviour of individuals in situa-
tions of armed conflict (scenarios D and E), are outside the scope of existing 
IHL unless they fall into a specially protected category of data, as in scenario 
A.43 
In light of this, it is submitted that these inherent limitations call for a 
prospective discussion that transcends the purely ontological inquiries re-
volving around the object-quality of computer data that have dominated the 
discourse so far. Given the significance of data for modern digitalised socie-
ties, one might propose a paradigm shift: To date, as was shown, the preva-
lent debate has taken the rules and principles of existing IHL (in particular 
the notions of “object” and “attack”) and applied them to “data.” A different 
and novel approach would be to take, as a starting point, the principles of 
existing data protection, data security, and other pertinent legal frameworks 
and attempt to apply them to contemporary armed conflict. Such an ap-
proach might be better suited to accommodate the actual relevance of data 
for the information society and to address the resultant protection needs 
during armed conflict. 
In reversing the direction of consideration, the leading question then be-
comes: Should certain types of data enjoy protection from adversarial cyber 
operations in armed conflict, irrespective of whether data qualifies as an “ob-
ject” or not? If this is accepted in principle, a number of different dimensions 
of “data protection” in armed conflict could be taken into account: 
(1) Should operations against the availability of civilian data be restricted 
even if they do not cause harmful (physical) consequences? 
(2) Should operations against the integrity of civilian data be restricted 
even if they do not cause harmful (physical) consequences? 
(3) Can operations against the confidentiality of civilian data be re-
stricted? 
As these questions imply, securing the confidentiality of personal data—
one of the core principles of existing data protection frameworks—is mostly 
outside the scope of what has so far been considered to require or deserve 
protection during armed conflict. However, the harm to individual civilians 
                                                                                                                      











could nevertheless be significant, even if the harm is not physical. As repeat-
edly confirmed by domestic courts around the world, the right to privacy—
“the authority of the individual to decide himself, on the basis of the idea of 
self-determination, when and within what limits information about his pri-
vate life should be communicated to others”44—is based on and serves as a 
protection of the dignity of a person. A complete collapse of privacy during 
armed conflict, as a consequence of adversarial military cyber operations, 
would be a paradigm shift of how wars are fought and could in principle 
conceivably lead to a paralysis of the targeted civilian society at large.  
As a starting point for discussion, the possible protection of the confi-
dentiality of (personal) civilian data could approach the question in relation 
to two different aspects. First, one might focus on the properties of the data 
itself and ask whether there are certain types of civilian data that should enjoy 
increased protection in and of themselves. For example, the GDPR acknowl-
edges “special categories of personal data” that are, “by their nature, partic-
ularly sensitive in relation to fundamental rights and freedoms” and thus 
“merit specific protection as the context of their processing could create sig-
nificant risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms.”45 These properties 
include “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, or trade union membership” as well as “genetic data, biometric data 
for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning 
health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation.”46 
It seems doubtful that these “special categories of data” would lose any of 
their sensitivity during armed conflict. Second, the discussion should zoom 
in on possible regulation of what adversarial States who obtain civilian data 
by way of conducting military cyber operations in armed conflict are permit-
ted to do with that data (or with different categories of personal civilian data). 
For example, while it is inconceivable to establish a blanket prohibition of 
surveillance and espionage activities, one might contemplate a rule against 
certain specified uses of the collected data such as publishing or leaking sen-
sitive personal data and/or a rule against exploiting such data sets for the 
purpose of coercion, extortion, or manipulation. Not least with the increas-
ing use of artificial intelligence in military decision making, States will be ever 
more inclined to obtain a full take of all data relevant to a given theater of 
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combat. Discussing restrictions regarding particularly harmful uses of such 




As this article has shown, the question of the protection of “data” in situa-
tions of armed conflict has, to date, been discussed from the angle of its 
object-quality, which makes the concept more readily fit the existing body of 
IHL. While this endeavour is worthwhile, the different ways data—and the 
information it represents as well as the attached rights and interests of indi-
viduals and societies it incorporates—can be affected by cyber operations 
might require us to look beyond this traditional scope and instead consider 
what kind of approach will be necessary to grasp and adequately protect the 
various functions of data in our digitalized societies that depend on confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability of both personal and non-personal data. 
With this in mind, the article has attempted to lay out some initial consider-
ations and questions in order to serve as a conversation starter. 
